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Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 57 (Sept. 14, 2017)1
CIVIL APPEAL: TORT LIABILITY
Summary
The Court found that discretionary-function immunity does not apply to intentional badfaith tort claims. The Court also expressly adopted the false light invasion of privacy right of
action in order to fully protect privacy interests. The Court also adopted the sliding scale
approach for evaluating IIED claims, holding that increased severity of conduct will require less
evidence to prove emotional distress.
Background
In 1993, following news coverage of Hyatt’s lucrative computer-chip patent, the Franchise
Tax Board (FTB) opened an audit on Hyatt’s 1991 California state income tax return which
claimed that Hyatt moved to Las Vegas in September of 1991. Following an in-depth audit, the
FTB concluded that Hyatt lied about the date of his move to Las Vegas in order to avoid state
income tax liability on his patent licensing, and that he owed a total of $4.5 million in state income
taxes, penalties, and interest. Based largely on the 1991 audit findings, the FTB also determined
that Hyatt owed over $6 million in taxes and interest for 1992.
Hyatt formally challenged the audits by filing two protests, and later filed suit in Nevada
in 1998 while the protests were still underway. Hyatt’s complaint included claims for declaratory
relief regarding the timing of his move to Nevada, a claim for negligence, and seven intentional
tort causes of action.
In response, FTB filed a motion for partial summary judgment over Hyatt’s declaratory
relief claim. The Court granted partial summary judgment and, as such, the jury was not to make
any findings related to the date of Hyatt’s move to Nevada, nor the validity of the audits’
conclusions. FTB also moved for partial summary judgment to preclude Hyatt from seeking
recovery for alleged economic damages. The Court granted partial summary judgment finding that
Hyatt’s evidence was speculative and did not adequately support his claim that the FTB’s actions
destroyed his patent licensing business in Japan.
At trial, the jury found in favor of Hyatt on all intentional tort causes of action and awarded
him $85 million for emotional distress, $52 million for invasion of privacy, $1,085,281.56 for
fraud, and $250 million in punitive damages. Hyatt then moved the district court for costs and,
following 15 months of discovery and other motion practice with a special master, the district court
awarded Hyatt $2.5 million in costs.
The FTB appealed from the district court’s final judgment and post-judgment award of
costs. Hyatt cross appealed, challenging the court’s ruling that he could not seek economic
damages for damage to his patent licensing business overseas.
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Discussion
FTB is not immune from suit under comity because discretionary-function immunity in Nevada
does not protect Nevada’s government or its employees from intentional torts and bad-faith
conduct
Under NRS § 41.031, Nevada has waived sovereign immunity from tort liability, with a
small number of exceptions.2 One exception is that of discretionary-function immunity under NRS
§ 41.032(2) which states that action cannot be brought against the state or its employee “based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of the state… whether or not the discretion is involved is abused.”3
Discretionary-function immunity in Nevada
Previously, the Court consistently held that this discretionary-function immunity did not
apply to bad-faith misconduct.4 However, the Court’s subsequent adoption of the two-part federal
test5 has since thrown the Falline exception’s validity into question. Under the two-part test,
discretionary-function immunity applies when government actions in controversy “(1) involve an
element of individual judgment or choice and (2) [are] based on considerations of social,
economic, or political policy.”6 FTB argued that this test abolished the Falline exception because
the federal test is purely objective. Hyatt, however, argued that Falline is still applicable since an
intentional bad faith tort cannot be discretionary or policy-based, and thus does not meet the
requirements of the federal test.
Courts that decline to recognize bad-faith conduct that calls for an inquiry into an
employee’s subjective intent
Some courts have concluded that bad-faith is not a relevant consideration in this test, since
this is an inappropriate evaluation of the employee’s subjective intent. 7 In Franklin, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the federal test’s focus on policy analysis makes inquiry
into employee state of mind or decision making processes inappropriate.8 As such, claims that
allege bad faith in the performance of facially authorized acts are automatically barred under
discretionary-function immunity.9 This approach protects government employees from second
guessing every decision and working in constant fear of litigation.10 To hold otherwise, the court
posited, would render discretionary-function immunity largely ineffective.11
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Courts that consider whether an employee subjectively intended to further policy by his or
her conduct
Other courts, however, have concluded that actions made in bad faith cannot possibly be
related to “any plausible policy objective.”12 In Coulthurst, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that actions involving laziness, haste, or inattentiveness did not involve judgment, choice or
policy considerations, and that in such instances, discretionary-function immunity should not
attach to shield the government from a lawsuit.13
The Court here evaluated both approaches and found that Falline is consistent with the
reasoning in Coulthurst, and affirmed their holding in Falline that NRS 41.032 does not protect
the government from claims related to intentional torts or bad faith misconduct.14 Further, since a
Nevada agency would not receive immunity from these claims, then neither does FTB under
comity principles.
Hyatt’s intentional tort causes of action
Since FTB could not invoke discretionary-function immunity, the Court then evaluated
each of Hyatt’s intentional tort claims under a de novo standard of review.
Invasion of privacy causes of action
Intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts
Hyatt’s invasion of privacy claims centered on FTB’s disclosure of his name, address and
social security number to third parties throughout the audit investigation. In evaluating claims
based upon intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts, the plaintiff must
actually have an expectation of privacy, and that expectation must be reasonable.15 Further, the
disclosure of a private fact must be offensive and objectionable to an ordinary person.16 Here, the
Court found that the public records defense17 precluded Hyatt from recovering for intrusion upon
seclusion and public disclosure of private facts since his name, address, and social security
number were already publicly available in court documents. Therefore, Hyatt did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and FTB’s disclosures were not offensive.
Hyatt argued that the public records in question were from long ago and should not be
considered part of the public domain. The Court rejected this argument noting that the public
records defense had never been limited based upon the time elapsed from public disclosure and
subsequent alleged invasion of privacy. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower court’s
judgment based on the jury verdict in Hyatt’s favor.
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Coulthurst v. United States, 214 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 109–111.
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False light invasion of privacy
Hyatt argued that FTB’s actions throughout the audit portrayed him as a “tax cheat” and
thus portrayed him in a false light. While only previously recognized impliedly, here the Court
expressly adopted the false light invasion of privacy right of action. The Court noted that while
false light and defamation are similar causes of action, many courts have deemed the false light
cause of action as necessary to provide a remedy to individuals who face situations (being falsely
portrayed as a crime victim, being falsely portrayed as destitute or ill) that do not rise to level of
defamation.18 Courts that do not recognize false light have done so due to the similarity between
the two causes of action, and the belief that defamation, appropriation, and IIED are adequate to
protect and provide remedies to plaintiffs.19 After weighing both approaches, the Court
ultimately concluded that the false light cause of action is necessary to fully protect privacy
interests.
Hyatt’s false light claim
The Court determined that Hyatt failed to present evidence that FTB’s actions portrayed
him in a false light. Rather, the actions taken by FTB (inclusion of Hyatt on a factually true
litigation roster and interactions with third parties regarding Hyatt’s finances and business
dealings) were shown to be in line with routine audit investigation procedure. Accordingly, the
Court reversed the district court’s judgment in Hyatt’s favor on this claim.
Breach of confidential relationship
A confidential relationship is established through “kinship or professional, business or
social relationships between the parties.”20 In Perry, a confidential relationship is recognized
when one party gains the confidence of another party and claims to act consistently in their
interest.21 Hyatt argued that because FTB promised to keep certain information private during the
audit, and because of FTB’s position over him during the audit process, there was a confidential
relationship as defined in Perry. However, FTB argued that the relationship between tax auditor
and taxpayer does not meet the confidential relationship standard and cited to Johnson v. Sawyer,
a case in which the Fifth Circuit held that Johnson and the IRS could not be in a confidential
relationship due to the adversarial nature of their relationship.22 Here, the Court rejected Hyatt’s
expansive interpretation of what constitutes a confidential relationship and found, like in
Johnson, that FTB’s duty was to proceed in the state’s, not Hyatt’s, best interest. Thus, the Court
reversed the lower court’s judgment in Hyatt’s favor on his breach of confidential relationship
claim.
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See Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051, 1055-57 (Ohio 2007); West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53
S.W.3d 640, 646 (Tenn. 2001).
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Id. at 947, 900 P.2d at 338.
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47 F.3d 716, 738 & n.47 (5th Cir. 1995).
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Abuse of process
To prevail on an abuse of process claim, the plaintiff must show that the other party used
the legal process in a willful and improper manner to accomplish something other than legal
resolution.23 Since FTB did not use any legal processes within the court system, Hyatt could not
meet the requirements for an abuse of process claim and the Court reversed the lower court’s
judgment in Hyatt’s favor on his abuse of process claim.
Fraud
To prove fraud it must be shown that (1) the defendant made a false representation, (2)
that this false representation was intended to persuade the plaintiff to act or not act in a certain
way, and (3) that the plaintiff had reason to rely and thereby suffered damages.24 FTB told Hyatt
that he could expect the FTB employee’s to treat him with courtesy throughout the audit process,
that needed information would be clearly and concisely requested, that his personal and financial
information would be kept confidential, and that the audit would be completed within a
reasonable amount of time.
Hyatt presented evidence that, contrary to the promises made, FTB disclosed his personal
information and that he was being audited to numerous third parties; that FTB sent information
related to the audit to individuals without first verifying their identity; that the audit ultimately
took over 11 years, and that this delay resulted in significant interest accrual; and that FTB
employees made disparaging remarks about the case and Hyatt. The Court found that based on
this evidence “a reasonable mind could conclude that the FTB made specific representation to
Hyatt that it intended for Hyatt to rely on, but which it did not intend to fully meet.” Further, the
Court found that it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that these interactions did lead Hyatt
to proceed differently in the audit process than he would have otherwise, and that this was to
Hyatt’s detriment. Thus, the Court concluded that the FTB was not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on this cause of action.
Fraud damages
NRS § 41.035 sets out a statutory cap on liability damages in tort actions against a state
entity. At the time of Hyatt’s injury in 1993, this cap was set at $50,000. The U.S. Supreme
Court disagreed with the Nevada Supreme Court’s previous decision that FTB was not entitled to
these statutory damages caps, and stated that refusal of the cap would be “a special and
discriminatory rule.”26 As such, FTB is entitled to the cap on damages that a similarly situated
Nevada agency would receive, and Hyatt’s awards on each successful tort claim must be capped
at this amount. This cap does not apply to awards for prejudgment interest or attorney’s fees and
costs.
25
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LaMantia v. Redisi, 118 Nev. 27, 31, 38 P.3d 877, 880 (2002).
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NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.035 (2017).
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Intentional infliction of emotional distress
During discovery, Hyatt refused to disclose his medical history and records, and was thus
barred from presenting medical evidence related to his claims of IIED at trial. However, Hyatt
presented other evidence, mostly in the form of witness testimony, to demonstrate his emotional
distress stemming from FTB’s actions. FTB argued that this witness testimony was insufficient
to prove Hyatt’s claim, and that medical evidence is necessary to meet the standard that plaintiff
provide “objectively verifiable indicia” to prove emotional distress.27 The Court had not
previously specifically addressed whether medical evidence is required to establish a claim for
IIED, however a sliding scale approach in which increased severity of conduct will require less
evidence to prove emotional distress, had impliedly been recognized in the past.28
Here, the Court explicitly adopted the sliding scale approach to prove an IIED claim, and
held that the severity of FTB’s conduct meant that less proof regarding Hyatt’s emotional
distress was necessary to support his claim. Further, it is reasonable that a jury presented with the
witness testimony Hyatt provided would determine that he suffered IIED. On the intentional
infliction of emotional distress cause of action, the Court concluded that the FTB was not entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
Trial Errors at district court
The FTB argued that the jury’s award should be reversed due to several errors committed
by the trial court. The court reviewed both claims under an abuse of discretion standard of
review.
Evidence improperly permitted challenging audits’ conclusion
FTB argued that the district court allowed certain evidence which required the jury to
make findings on Hyatt’s residency and the accuracy of the audit’s findings, in contravention of
the prior summary judgment ruling in FTB’s favor. The Court found that certain pieces of
evidence related to alleged mathematical errors, auditor behavior, and testimony related to fraud
penalties were presented to challenge the audit’s quality, and it was an abuse of discretion for the
district court to permit this evidence.
Jury instruction permitting consideration of audits’ determinations
FTB also challenged the district court’s use of a revised jury instruction which included
the following language:
There is nothing in the correct Jury Instruction No. 24 that would prevent
you during your deliberations from considering the appropriateness or
correctness of the analysis conducted by the FTB employees in reaching
its residency determination and conclusion.
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Miller v. Jones, 114 Nev. 1291, 1300, 970 P.2d 571, 577 (1998).
Nelson v. City of Las Vegas, 99 Nev. 548, 555, 665 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1983).
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The Court found that this jury instruction violated the jurisdictional limit imposed on the
case, and that the district court abused its discretion in giving this instruction.
Exclusion of evidence to rebut adverse inference
FTB also challenged the district court’s exclusion of evidence it sought to introduce to
rebut an adverse inference sanction for spoliation of evidence. FTB changed an email server in
1999 and subsequently overwrote the backup tapes on which the emails were stored. Hyatt
requested discovery of the tapes and then filed for sanctions when he discovered the emails were
deleted. The Court ruled in favor of Hyatt and decided to give an adverse inference jury
instruction, allowing the jury to infer that negligently destroyed evidence by FTB would have
been harmful to them.29
A court may impose a permissible adverse inference when evidence is negligently, not
willfully destroyed.30 This lesser adverse inference does not shift the burden of proof to the
spoliating party to show that the destroyed evidence was not unfavorable, but rather allows the
fact finder, based on other evidence, to determine whether a fact exists.31 Since FTB’s spoliation
was negligent, they should have been allowed to present to the jury their efforts to preserve the
emails in order to demonstrate that there was nothing unfavorable to them therein. Exclusion of
this evidence was an abuse of discretion, and the Court reversed the district court’s ruling on this
issue.
Other evidentiary errors
Finally, the Court held that the court below abused its discretion in excluding evidence
relating to Hyatt’s patent loss and federal tax audit since it was more probative than unfairly
prejudicial.
Evidentiary and jury instruction errors do not warrant reversal
Despite these errors, the Court found that FTB failed to show that, if not for these errors,
a different result may have been reached regarding liability. However, the Court did find that but
for the errors, a different result would have been reached regarding damages, and that the
evidence supports a $50,000 damage award (the statutory cap) on the IIED claims.
Punitive damages
NRS § 41.035(1) provides that awards for damages in a tort action against a government
entity many not include exemplary or punitive damages.32 Under comity principles, the Court
thus affords FTB immunity from punitive damages.
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See, e.g., Bass-Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 446, 452, 134 P.3d 103, 106, 109 (2006).
Id. at 447–48, 134 P.3d at 106–07.
Id. at 448–449, 134 P.3d at 107.
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.035(1) (2017).
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Costs
Since the Court reversed the judgments on several tort causes of action, the district
court’s award of costs must also be reversed and the case remanded to allow the district court to
determine which party now prevails.33
The Court also took the opportunity to address FTB’s challenge to the district court’s
procedure in awarding fees, and held that the acceptance of Hyatt’s documents to support costs
sought after the statutory deadline was not improper since the statute allows filing to take place
for “such further time as the court or judge may grant.”34 However, the Court held that the
district court did err in refusing FTB to file an objection to the master’s report and
recommendation on costs since the cost issue was not placed before a jury, and NRCP 53(e)(2)
allows written objection to a master’s report.35 On remand, the district court must allow FTB to
file objections to a master’s report before a cost award is entered.
Hyatt’s Cross Appeal
Hyatt challenged the district court’s summary judgment ruling which prevented him from
seeking economic damages based on the theory that he lost significant income related to
potential licensing revenue in Japan due to the FTB audit. Hyatt presented testimony from
experts detailing what they believe would happen based upon their familiarity with Japanese
business culture and practices. The district court found this evidence to be “speculative and
insufficient.” Here, the Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment after
determining that Hyatt failed to prove that any of the steps in his proposed hypothetical actually
occurred.
Conclusion
As a threshold matter, the Court found that discretionary-function immunity does not
apply to intentional and bad-faith tort claims. Since FTB was not immune to suit, the Court then
considered respondent’s tort causes of action individually and found that (1) appellant was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all tort causes of action except for fraud and IIED
claims, (2) the district court’s evidentiary and jury instruction errors were harmless, (3) damages
for fraud and IIED are subject to NRS § 41.035(1) statutory cap, and (4) recovery of punitive
damages precluded. The Court remanded prejudgment interest and cost awards, and affirmed the
district court’s prior grant of summary judgment in FTB’s favor regarding Hyatt’s claim for
economic damages.
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